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The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is briefly characterised by stressing its main pillars,
such as verified destruction of CW stockpiles and destruction/conversion of CW production facili-
ties (CWPFs), verified non-production of CW by the chemical industries, assistance and protec-
tion), and international cooperation. The CWC´s leading principle in defining the CW (protecting
it generally against scientific and technological development, i. e. so called General Purpose Crite-
rion) is thoroughly elucidated showing its relation to the CWC´s sophisticated verification system.
Status of implementation (as of August 2005) shows main data obligatory declared by the States
Parties (SP), among them 6 possessors of CW stockpiles (Russia, USA, India, South Korea, Albania
and Libya). From the declared 71 373 agent-tons, 12 889 have been destroyed, from the decla-
red 8 679 M items of munitions (containers), 2 420 have been destroyed, which means that the
anticipated 10 years deadline for CW destruction (after entry into force – EIF) will be not mana-
ged. For Russia and USA the allowed extension by another 5 years has been already agreed. From
the 64 CWPFs (operational after 1946), declared by 12 SPs, 53 have been certified as destroyed/
converted. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is briefly presen-
ted and main results of the First Review Conference (2003) analysed on the base of the adopted
principal documents. Future problems of implementing the CWC are connected in the first line
with its universality, because among 16 non-SPs, several countries (located mainly in the Near
East and on the Korean peninsula) are presumed to be CW-possessors. Special emphasis is
laid on both, threats and benefits of the scientific and technological development for current
implementing the CWC as well as of its implementation in future after all CW stockpiles have
been destroyed.
Keywords: Chemical weapons (CW), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 1st Review Conference, Scientific &
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Introduction
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro-
duction, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, shortly depicted as Convention on gene-
ral and comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons,
or Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was adopted in
1992 after complex negotiations on the soil of the Confe-
rence on Disarmament (and previous multilateral negotia-
ting fora in Geneva), lasting for nearly a quarter of a century.
The reason was not only then proceeding East-West con-
frontation and the Cold War but mainly difficulties given by
the worldwide spread of chemical industry and relatively
easy possibility of clandestine synthesis of chemical warfare
agents in militarily relevant quantities. This and also bad
experience with previously adopted Convention on the
Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and of
Their Destruction (BTWC) opened for signature in 1972,
entering into force in 1975, lacking in the first line any ob-
jective verification mechanisms, has been reflected in very
careful definitions and criteria, defining purposes not prohi-
bited by the Convention and mainly very complex and
sophisticated verification system. The CWC is by no doubt
the best elaborated disarmament document, totally outla-
wing one important and very dangerous kind of weapons of
mass annihilation, committing the States Parties (SP) to
destruction of the chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles and
production facilities (CWPF). Ten years after opening for
signature and six years after entry into force (EIF), the First
Conference of the SPs reviewing operations of the CWC
has been convened in The Hague, stating generally good
acceptance by the international community, showing po-
sitive results of implementing the CWC, and defining the
course for future.
Chemical Weapons Convention – basic facts
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), opened for signa-
ture in Paris, on January 13, 1993, entered into force on
April 29, 1997. Its complexity is reflected in almost 200
pages of text, containing Preamble, 24 Articles, and 3
Annexes: On Chemicals (6 p), On Implementation & Verifi-
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cation (105 p), and On Protection of Confidential Informa-
tion (5 p).1
The genie of this Convention lies mainly in the mood of de-
fining the scope of the prohibition. The CWC is rather by
purpose than compound oriented. This means that it is
nothing like the list of prohibited compounds as some less
informed people mostly expect. The CWC´s leading prin-
ciple, which is often reported as General Purpose Criterion
(GPC) is contained in the wording of Article II, para 1,
defining the purposes of the CWC among “Chemical
Weapons”:
Article II DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. “Chemical Weapons” means the following, together or
separately:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where in-
tended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such
purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cau-
se…..;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use…..;
Toxic chemicals are further defined in Article II, para 2 as
meaning:
“Any chemical which through its chemical action on life pro-
cesses can cause death, temporary incapacitation or perma-
nent harm to humans and animals. This includes all such
chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of
production and regardless of whether they are produced in
facilities, in munitions or elsewhere”.
Purposes, not prohibited under the Convention are listed in
Article II, para 9 as meaning:
(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceuti-
cal or other peaceful purposes;
(b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes, directly re-
lated to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection
against chemical weapons;
(c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical
weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic proper-
ties of chemicals as a method of warfare;
(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control pur-
poses.
From this explanations, quoting relevant articles of the
CWC is evident, consistently with the mentioned GPC, that
the Convention:
a) is nothing like a list of prohibited compounds,
b) covers any toxic chemical intended to be used for chemi-
cal warfare (and therefore developed, produced and stock-
piled), pursuant to Article II, para 1 (a) and para 2, this
means even those not yet synthesised. This means that the
CWC is actually open-ended and the prohibition covers
any scientific and technological development.
The CWC lists (as the verification instrument) the most im-
portant toxic chemicals and their precursors, endangering
the CWC within Three Schedules, constituted according to
the risk the chemicals pose for the Convention. Schedule 1
contains super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors
that have no peaceful uses, Schedule 2 contains less dange-
rous toxic chemicals and precursors produced in small
quantities, and Schedule 3 lists toxic industrial chemicals
(that were in the former history used for chemical warfare)
and precursors produced on mass scale. A frequent misun-
derstanding occurs considering the Schedules as the lists of
“prohibited compounds”, although, it is clearly stated in the
CWC that “Schedules do not constitute a definition of
CW”. The open-ended prohibition, however, does not
mean that new toxic chemicals (other than those contained
in Schedules) cannot appear on battlefields being used by
non States Parties or less possibly by SPs, breaching the
CWC or more possibly by the terrorist groups. That is why
the scientific and technological development is to be very
cautiously watched, international verification measures
extended, national authorities and operation systems esta-
blished, and respective legislation adopted in order to
enable prevention and adequate response in real time
(repression, protection, rescue and recovery) in cases of
emergency.
Status of implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention
(If it is not otherwise stated, the data are
reported as of March, 2006)
– At present, there are altogether 178 States Parties to the
Convention. Important is the membership of all P-5 mem-
bers of UN Security Council and vast majority of states with
declarable CWC facilities.
– Six SPs (Russia, USA, India, South Korea, Albania and
Libya) declared possession of CW.
– Among SPs, there are 12 possessors of former (after 1946)
CW production facilities (CWPFs), i. e. Russia, USA, India,
South Korea, Libya, France, UK, China, Iran, Japan, Bosnia
& Hercegovina, and Serbia & Montenegro (last two SPs de-
clared the same former CWPF).
– The CWC implementation & verification regime now co-
vers more than 90 % of world’s population, but what is
more important, 98 % of world’s chemical industry.
Reviewing the figure on the number of SPs, it is also impor-
tant to note that there are 8 signatory states that have not
yet ratified (inter alia Israel) and altogether 8 countries that
have not even signed. Beside not very important states, it is
necessary to note D. P. R. of Korea and the neighbours of
Israel (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria) bounding their signa-
ture on the Israel’s withdrawal from its nuclear weapons
programme. Significant breakthrough in this scheme was
accession of Libya to the CWC in February, 2004. Impor-
tant is also, that all above explicitly named states are SPs to
the Geneva Protocol (1925), prohibiting use in war of che-
mical weapons (and of bacteriological methods of warfare).
Assessing the CWC’s universality (requirement of the 1st
Review Conference), one can come to interesting results
comparing the CWC with other agreements on weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) as can be shown by Table 1. It
seems that one could be satisfied with relatively high num-
ber of SPs, 9 years after EIF in comparison with other main
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arms-control/disarmament agreements (NPT – Treaty on
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons). Nevertheless, for
the full assurance in preventing any use of CW, it is necessa-
ry to reach higher number of SPs, mainly, because most of
the above mentioned important non-SPs concentrated in
Near and Middle East and on Korean peninsula are suppo-
sed nearly certainly to be possessors of CW (not to speak on
possession of other WMD like in the case of Israel).
T a b l e 1 – Universality: CWC compared with other main
agreements on WMD
T a b l i c a 1 – Univerzalnost: Usporedba CWC s Konvencija-









NPT 1970 187 – 7
BTWC 1975 155 16 23
CWC 1997 178 8 8
The worldwide status of CWC implementation is witnessed
by another important data:
– 161 initial declarations (on possession / non-possession of
CW) were obtained from the SPs,
– 151 national authorities were established in the SPs.
Especially the latter number is evidently still insufficient,
taking into consideration the tasks of such governmental
office in the national implementation measures, starting
with the respective legislation and then supervision of the
domestic chemical industry and any cooperative activities
with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). What is more alarming, only 108 SPs
(i. e. 61 %) have adopted implementation legislation and
respective comprehensive legislation has been adopted
only in 61 SPs (i. e. 34 %) till now.
The most important data from the declarations of SPs (see
Table 2) show the worldwide problems with possession,
storage, former production of CW as well as with the spread
of chemical industry as the point of outcome, not only for
the destruction of CW at present and in the near future, but
for monitoring the non-production of CW in chemical in-
dustry in future. The total number of declared sites (6003)
which are to be regularly or randomly inspected shows the
high burden of expected verification activities. At this stage
of implementation, the verification activities have been ob-
viously concentrated on storage and destruction, and in
industry on facilities producing scheduled chemicals.
At present, the most important activity in implementing the
CWC is obviously destruction of CW:
– Declared chemical agents
Destroyed (January 31, 2006)
71 373 tonnes
12 889 tonnes
– Declared munitions (containers)
Destroyed (January 31, 2006)
8 679 M items
2 420 M items
As expected, the destruction is proceeding asymmetrically,
meeting domestic financial and technological problems
with construction of destruction facilities. It is therefore
expected, that the scheduled 10 years term for total CW
destruction according to the CWC will not be managed and
the allowed exemption to extend the destruction period for
another 5 years (for technological and / or financial reasons)
has been already agreed at both major possessors, i. e. Rus-
sia and the USA.
Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons – OPCW
Pursuant to the CWC, after its signature, the Preparatory
Commission was founded and after EIF the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with
the seat in The Hague (Johan de Wittlaan 32, 2517 JR
Den Haag) was established. For more information see
http//:www.opcw.org.
The Organisation consists of three main elements:
a) Conference of the State Parties (all SPs meets regularly
once a year), present Chair: H. E. Amb. Mr. Krzysztof Patu-
rej (Poland)
b) Executive Council (41 members distributed among the
SPs on a regional, rotating base for 2 years term, meets
regularly 4 times a year), present Chair: H. E. Amb. Mr. Al-
fonso Dastis Quecedo (Spain)
c) Technical Secretariat (about 520 staff members, of them
about 200 inspectors), Director General: H. E. Amb. Roge-
lio Pfirter (Argentina),
There are also three subsidiary bodies: Scientific Advisory
Board (25 independent experts), Confidentiality Commis-
sion, and Advisory Board on Administrative and Financial
Matters.
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T a b l e 2 – Important data from the declarations by the SPs




CW Storage Facilities (CWSFs) 6 35
CW Destruction Facilities (CWDFs) 6 43
CW Production Facilities (CWPFs) 12 64b
Abandoned CW 3 16
Old CW 12 46
Industrial Production:
Schedule 1 Chemicals 21 27
Schedule 2 Chemicals 35 437
Schedule 3 Chemicals 32 476
Discrete Organic Chemicals 76 4887
a Altogether 72 SPs have been inspected
b Of the 64 reported former (after 1946) CWPFs, 51 have been destroyed
& converted
The First Review Conference
The character and tasks for the Conference were determi-
ned as follows:
– Review operations of the Convention,
– Take account of scientific and technological develop-
ment,
– Lessons learned and recommendations for future imple-
mentation,
– Not an amendment (revision) conference.
The attendance represented 113 (then) SPs, 2 signatory
states (Haiti, Israel), 2 non-signatory states (Libya, Ango-
la), 5 International Organisations (ESA, ICRC, PCA, CTBTO,
UNIDIR), 22 NGOs and 6 Industry Associations. The Con-
ference did not result in radical change of direction for the
OPCW or in substantive decisions on crucial, still outstan-
ding issues (e. g. so called “non-lethal” agents, riot control
agents, “law enforcement”, nil declarations in respect of
OCPFs, and like. A number of priorities have, however
been clearly recognised.
To those priorities belong:
– Universality of the Convention,
– National implementation measures,
– International Cooperation and Assistance,
– Verification regime for the chemical industry
– Optimisation of verification measures
– Scientific and technological development and
– Functioning of the OPCW.
The detailed explanation goes beyond the frame of this pa-
per. For further information see the adopted documents.
This is in the first line the Political declaration containing 23
paras2 and the main written result, i. e. the Review docu-
ment with 134 paras.3 Except many statements, mostly ge-
neral only, the programme did not go too deep into the
problems of impact of scientific & technological develop-
ment on the CWC that are obviously associated with its fu-
ture implementation. This problem was analysed in the do-
cument prepared by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board
introduced in the Note by the Director General.4 It was ge-
nerally expected that this would influence future activities
of the OPCW. This process, i. e. joint assessment of OPCW
SAB findings and recommendations by the Governmental
experts and SPs to establish further strategy, has been alrea-
dy commenced.
Main pillars of the Convention and impact of
the scientific and technological development
To the main pillars of the CWC belong:
– Verified destruction of chemical weapons (CW) and of
CW production facilities (CWPF), i. e. disarmament,
– Verified non-production of CW, i. e. non-proliferation,
– Assistance and Protection,
– International Cooperation.
It is obvious that scientific and technological development
may have both positive and negative impact on the CWC
and its implementation. The positive impact is connected
with destruction technologies, utilisation of sophistica-
ted Hi-Tech analytical equipment and methodologies
for all objective verification activities and in all branches
of equipment, measures and know-how connected with
assistance and protection. On the other hand, the scientific
and technological development poses threats in rapid pace
of synthesis of both scheduled and unscheduled chemicals
that are, as a matter of fact, prohibited according to the
GPC principle which does not mean that they cannot ap-
pear on battlefields or elsewhere, being used by non-SPs or
by SPs breaching the CWC or at terrorist strikes. Various
aspects of the impact of scientific and technological deve-
lopment on the CWC were discussed on an IUPAC work-
shop recently.5 This problem is also matter of a review
article.6
Threats of scientific and technological
development for potential proliferation
of chemical weapons
One threat lies already now in the inconsistency of the
CWC regarding the riot-control agents. Even if law enforce-
ment and domestic riot control are explicitly named among
purposes non prohibited by the Convention (as mentioned
above), the particular part of the wording (Article I,5),
dealing with prohibition of using riot-control agents as a
method of warfare is generally considered as ipso facto
exempting these agents from the definition of toxic chemi-
cals (for the purposes of the CWC) and thus also from the
routine verification regime, because these agents are un-
scheduled. This seems to be a significant loophole, allowing
circumvention of the CWC, because R & D and production
of this class of chemicals are out of stringent verification
measures, typical for this disarmament document. One can
therefore imagine legitimate search for new effective and
safe (how safe?) irritants and incapacitants for police purpo-
ses but also temptations for uncontrolled production of
chemicals that might once occur on the battlefield. This is
an actually existing problem of present very dangerous
orientation on the co called “non-lethal” agents. Every toxi-
cologist knows, however, that any toxic effect or response
of organism (including lethal) is dose- (exposition-) depen-
dent. This means that something like non-lethal agents do
not exist at all. Safety index of irritants (incapacitants of all
kind) depends on the difference between (statistically de-
termined) doses (concentration and exposition time) with
intolerable effect and that causing death.
This index should be as big as possible at the riot-control
agents but it is in the nature that it cannot be unlimited; that
is why the thesis on “non-lethality” is an actual mystification
if not cheating.
Future threats are mainly given by the changing face of synt-
hetic and manufacturing methods for producing both sche-
duled and unscheduled chemicals. It is mainly rapid pace
of development in biomolecular science (e. g. genomics
and proteomics) and in synthesis (i. e. combinatorial chemi-
stry) giving rise to appearing of new toxic chemicals for po-
tential misuse. These methods enable to synthesise whole
series with “tailored” structures (i. e. with theoretically pre-
dicted structures) very quickly. Group syntheses, lasting
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months to years in the half of 20th century, can be achieved
within weeks now.
We are now faced also with considerably changed cha-
racter of chemical industries. Many parts of chemical indu-
stry operate with multipurpose batch facilities, which can
readily be switched from one product to another. The po-
tential of producing toxic chemicals is considerably enhan-
ced by the use of micro-reactors producing large volumes in
small plants. Globalisation of this industry needs thus re-
viewing verification regime of so called “other chemical
production facilities” (OCPF), producing discrete organic
chemicals. The ever-growing range of toxic chemicals and
new processes of small-scale syntheses increase also a
threat of chemical terrorism.
Benefits of scientific and technological
development for the destruction
of chemical weapons
The destruction and disposal methods, applied for elimina-
tion of obsolete chemical weaponry (used on the mass scale
for elimination of the captured German and Japanese che-
mical arsenals after WW-II), such as sea dumping, earth bu-
rial, open-pit burning, and exceptionally also blasting, were
routinely used till the 1970s. The last known event of this art
was operation CHASE, when the US dumped commissio-
ned munitions filled with nerve agents in the Caribic. Such
procedures became gradually unacceptable due to envi-
ronmental awareness and respective domestic legislation.
Therefore, R&D on new destruction/disposal technologies
started in the 1970s in connection with upgrading chemical
arsenals, long before destruction pursuant to the CWC and
even its drafting had commenced. It is obvious, that the
most common technology for destruction of waste chemi-
cals by incineration was the principal technological orienta-
tion. During negotiating the CWC, there were attempts to
prescribe the concrete destruction technique but final text
of the CWC leaves it to the responsibility of the SPs, of cour-
se requiring completeness and irreversibility of destruction
to solid non toxic remnants and scrap metal under strict pa-
rallel requirements on workplace safety and environmental
protection. At present, about 15 basic technologies of
destruction have been suggested (some of them having up
to 6 various modifications), including some very curious
ones like underground nuclear explosion, or simultaneous
destruction with burning demilitarised missile engine and
like. For the overview, see e. g.,6 while their practical
assessment from various aspects is a matter of other review
publications.7,8
Benefits of scientific and technological
development for verification
of implementing the CWC
Main benefit of scientific and technological development
for verifying provisions of the CWC is given by the possibili-
ty of using objective analytical methods and Hi-Tech instru-
mentation. Many up-to-date separation methods (such as
GC and HPLC) coupled with identification techniques
(such as MS) and other spectrophotometric methods (e. g.
FT-IR) with computerised data libraries accessible on-line
have been introduced in the OPCW – designated accre-
dited laboratories and the most modern portable GC-MS
instrumentation and validated database (OCAD); conta-
ining data on several thousand chemicals is routinely used
by OPCW inspection teams in on-site verification. The
problem is follow-up of the development of toxic chemicals
(mainly those unscheduled), technical upgrading of equip-
ment, analysis of toxins and biomedical samples, conserva-
tion and transportation of samples for off-site analysis and
like. It is also desirable to introduce automatic analytical
techniques including remote (off-site) methods with auto-
mated data transmission and processing in real time to
enable decreasing the burden of prescribed continuous
on-site presence of inspectors at CW destruction. This
should enable to shift the inspection effort to verifying non-
production by the chemical industries of potential CW, i. e.
future non-proliferation.
Contribution of scientific and technological
development to Assistance and Protection
Incorporating Article X (Assistance and Protection) into the
CWC was very important. Threats of CW use still exists from
the non-SPs, SPs till the CW arsenals have been destroyed,
exceptionally from old and abandoned CW, not to speak
about terrorist use of toxic chemicals. Protective equipment
will be needed also on the battlefields not only following
use of CW and other WMD. Even destroyed industrial and
social infrastructures of modern societies, releasing toxic,
inflammable, liquefied, explosive, radioactive and infec-
tious materials on landscape, densely populated with such
infrastructures after strikes only with conventional warfare,
need protective equipment; similarly like at events occur-
ring in the peacetime as a result of accidents and disasters
caused by personal, material or system failure or by terrorist
strikes.
Assistance and protection according to Article X envisages
providing equipment and know-how (in the area of detec-
tion, identification and monitoring, decontamination, per-
sonal protection and treatment) by the OPCW and by
higher developed SPs to those less developed or even
without adequate protection. For the detailed overview of
some technical issues under Article X and of an example for
providing assistance and protection by a SP, see.9
Other challenges of scientific
and technological development
Among other challenges that the scientific and technologi-
cal developments pose, it is possible to name mainly those
for the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS), as well as those
associated with education and outreach.
Rapid pace of development of new unscheduled chemicals
and new production processes of, both, scheduled and
unscheduled chemicals as mentioned above needs the TS
to be kept up to date. This needs to continuously review
relevant scientific and technological development. In this
connection, it seems reasonable to further work on recom-
mendations of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)4 with
special emphasis on the problems of verification.
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Not only future scientific and technological developments,
but in the first line the CWC as such and its profound know-
ledge and correct interpretation, should be matter of edu-
cation and outreach to scientific and engineering commu-
nities as well as to decision-makers in SPs, SSs and nSSs. It is
necessary to extend cooperation with relevant national and
international professional organisations, academia, univer-
sities, industry associations including NGOs representing
concerned engineers and scientists, mainly those, having
heavily contributed when the CWC was negotiated.
Conclusions
Operations of the Chemical Weapons Convention are pro-
ceeding satisfactory judging according to the status of its
implementation by 178 States Parties and verification by
the Organisation for Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons
in The Hague nine years after entry into force. The First
Review Conference stressed the importance of achieving
worldwide universality in order to totally eliminate the
heredity of past chemical arsenals once forever, prevent
threats, and utilise benefits of the scientific and technologi-
cal development for the CWC implementation in the fore-
seeable future. Even, if the CWC is open-ended and thus
envisages the scientific technological development, it is
necessary to reflect possible threats in the general approach
of OPCW and national authorities, mainly in continuous
updating the verification regime and in adopting respective
responsibility of national authorities and comprehensive
legislation in the States Parties.
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SAÝETAK
Kemijsko razoruÞanje: tekuæi problemi u primjeni Konvencije o kemijskom oruÞju
J. Matoušek
Kratko je opisana Konvencija o kemijskom oruÞju (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC), na-
glašavajuæi glavne stavke, kao što je verificirano uništavanje zaliha kemijskog oruÞja i uništavanje
ili prenamjena postrojenja za proizvodnju, verifikacija prestanka proizvodnje kemijskog oruÞja u
kemijskim industrijama, pomoæ i zaštita, te meðunarodna suradnja. Vodeæe naèelo Konvencije o
kemijskom oruÞju u definiranju kemijskog oruÞja (štiteæi ga opæenito od znanstvenog i tehno-
loškog napretka) je tzv. Kriterij opæe namjene koji je potpuno razjašnjen te se pokazuje njegov od-
nos prema sofisticiranom sustavu verifikacije CWC-a. Stanje primjene Konvencije (od kolovoza
2005.) pokazuje osnovne glavne podatke koje su kao obvezu dostavile drÞave èlanice, a meðu
njima je šest drÞava koje imaju zalihe kemijskog oruÞja (Rusija, SAD, Indija, JuÞna Koreja, Albanija
i Libija). Od deklariranih 71 373 tona agensa, 12 889 je uništeno; od deklariranih 8,679 milijuna
komada streljiva (kontejnera) 2420 je uništeno, što znaèi da se predviðenih deset godina kao
krajnji rok za uništavanje kemijskog oruÞja (od poèetka primjene Konvencije), neæe moæi odrÞati.
Za Rusiju i SAD je veæ dogovoreno produljenje od daljnjih pet godina. Od 64 postrojenja za
proizvodnju bojnih otrova (operativnih poslije 1946.) koje je deklariralo 12 drÞava èlanica, 53 je
verificirano kao uništeno odnosno prenamijenjeno. Kratko je predstavljena Organizacija za
zabranu kemijskog oruÞja (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW), a
glavni rezultati Prve pregledne konferencije (odrÞane 2003.) su analizirani na temelju prihvaæenih
osnovnih dokumenata. Buduæi problemi primjene CWC povezani su u prvom redu s njezinom
univerzalnošæu, s obzirom na to da je meðu 18 neèlanica i nekoliko zemalja (lociranih uglavnom
na Bliskom istoku i Korejskom poluotoku) za koje se pretpostavlja da posjeduju kemijsko oruÞje.
Posebni naglasak stavljen je na prijetnje i koristi od znanstvenog i tehnološkog razvoja na tekuæe
primjene Konvencije kao i njezine primjene u buduænosti nakon što sve zalihe kemijskog oruÞja
budu uništene.
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